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EFFECTIVE DESEGREGATION WITHOUT BUSING:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ANTI-INJUNCTION LEGISLATION
EDWARD DASHIELL HOLMES*
Existing laws and proposed statutes that limit the power of federal
courts to bus school children to achieve school desegregation present
serious constitutional issues. The power of the judiciary to enforce
and protect constitutionally guaranteed rights must be reconciled
with the power of Congress to exercise its limited control over the
judiciary and enforce the fourteenth amendment with "appropriate
legislation." This paper, however, is restricted to an analysis of stat-
utory limitations on the injunctive power and does not consider
other anti-busing measures such as limitations on the federal spend-
ing power or proposed constitutional amendments. In particular,
this paper will focus on whether proposed anti-busing statutes may
be validly enacted and, if so, whether they may be applied constitu-
tionally. Significantly, these determinations may ultimately turn on
questions of fact that can only be resolved in the federal courts.
I. THE BUSING DILEiiA
The present busing controversy can be described as a delayed re-
action to Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)' in which the
Supreme Court declared racial segregation in public schools uncon-
stitutional. The Court's subsequent decision in Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown II) gave to the lower courts only broad guidelines
requiring that school boards desegregate "with all deliberate speed."3
* B.A., Virginia Military Institute, 1970; J.D., Washington University, 1973.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3. Id. at 301. But Chief Justice Warren also added that:
[Tjhe courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from
the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system,
personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact
units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on
a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be
necessary in solving the foregoing problems.
Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added).
Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court noted that this enumeration was only
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Consequently, desegregation over the next thirteen years was delayed
by dilatory tactics and hindered by urban growth and shifting popula-
tion.4 To ensure desegregation, Congress later enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 19645 which, inter alia, authorized suits by the federal
government to protect the constitutional right to equal education.
In spite of this measure, subsequent litigation illustrated that satis-
factory desegregation was not achieved.
The implementation of Brown I continued "with all deliberate
speed" until 1968 when the Supreme Court in Green v. County School
Board declared that desegregation plans must "realistically... work
now."7 In Green, defendant school board sought to achieve deseg-
regation with a "freedom of choice" plan by which students could
choose to attend schools where they would be in a racial minority.
The Court struck down this arrangement because it failed to observe
immediate desegregation. Furthermore, the Court remarked that
"unitary" school systems were the ultimate end of desegregation and
that discrimination must be "eliminated root and branch."' The
Court reiterated this position in Alexander v. Holmes County Board
of Education9 where it refused to grant additional time to implement
a district court order. In so holding, the Court remarked that the
"standard of allowing all deliberate speed for desegregation is no
longer constitutionally permissible. Under explicit holdings of this
Court the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual
school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary
schools."10 Pursuant to these new standards, the Court in United States
v. Montgomery County Board of Education". upheld a plan assign-
"suggestive rather than exhaustive." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27 n.10 (1971).
4. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1971).
This trend is aptly characterized by the famous dictum in Briggs v. Elliot, 132
F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955), where the required "desegregation" was
distinguished from "integration."
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to c-9 (1964). Section 2000c-6 prohibited busing of
school children to achieve racial balance. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., this was construed to apply to de facto segregration only. 402
U.S. 1, 17 (1971).
6. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
7. Id. at 439.
8. Id. at 437-38. The Court has not actually defined the word "unitary."
9. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
10. Id. at 20.
11. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
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ing teachers to various schools on the basis of a mathematical ratio
similar to that of whites to blacks in the surrounding community.
This, the Court maintained, would "expedite, by means of specific
commands, the day when a completely unified, unitary, nondiscrim-
inatory school system becomes a reality instead of a hope."1 2
The mathematical ratio approach was soon extended to students
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (Swann I),13
where the school district in question was 70% white and 29% black
with more than half of the black students assigned to schools 99%
black.'1 This arrangement was attacked on the theory that Green
required a "unitary" system unlike that of the school board in Swann
I. After determining that desegregation efforts were insufficient,15 the
district court ordered the restructuring of attendance zones, desegrega-
tion of school buses and faculties, an optional majority to minority
transfer plan, and the zoning, pairing and grouping of elementary
schools.' To achieve a 71 to 29 ratio of students in most schools,
similar to that of whites to blacks throughout the district, students
would be assigned to the appropriate school and bused an average
12. Id. at 235.
13. 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C.), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 431 F.2d
138 (4th Cir. 1970), district court order aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See generally
Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. Cm. L. RFv. 697 (1971); May, Busing, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg and the Future of Desegregation in the Fifth Circuit, 49 TExAs
L. REv. 884 (1971); Note, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
cation: Roadblock to the Implementation of Brown, 12 Wit. & MARY L. REv.
838 (1971); 20 KAN. L. Rv. 165 (1971).
14. 402 U.S. at 6-7.
15. 306 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
16. 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970). Attendance zone lines are "re-
structured" so that children may be forced to attend a school not previously
within their zone. See, e.g., Pate v. Dade County School Bd., 434 F.2d 1151
(5th Cir. 1970); Conley v. Lake Charles School Bd., 434 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1970).
"Pairing" is the reorganization of one black school with one white school. One
school would serve children of both races in the lower grades while the other
would serve the integrated higher grades. "Grouping" is the same practice ap-
plied to three or more schools. Usually the schools paired are contiguous, but
this is not required. See, e.g., Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 432 F.2d 362
(5th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Board of Educ., 432 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1970). Ma-jority-to-minority transfer plans allow students to voluntarily transfer from a
school in which they are in a racial majority to one in which they are in a
racial minority. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
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distance of seven miles for no more than 35 minutes." The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit partially reversed the busing order,
but the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the district court.1 s The
Court held that the equitable remedial powers of the federal courts
were broad enough to encompass the forced busing of students.10
Since Green and Brown II required immediate desegregation and the
creation of a unitary system, the "task is to correct by a balancing of
the individual and collective interests the condition that offends the
Constitution."2 In a companion case to Swann I, Davis v. Board of
School Commissioners,21 the Court held that in balancing those in-
terests "all available techniques" should be considered to achieve
the greatest possible desegregation. 22 In Swann I the interests were
such that busing was both reasonable and necessary in order to bring
the school system into compliance with Brown L The existence of
racially identifiable schools, the earmark of de jure segregation,
could be eliminated only by the assignment of students on a racial
basis. Significantly, however, the Court placed the following limita-
tions on its equitable power: 1) busing is only appropriate to correct
de jure segregation; 23 2) the use of mathematical formulae in assign-
ing students is only a "starting point," and not every school within the
district must reflect the approved ratio;24 and 3) the forced busing
must be "reasonable" and cannot "risk either the health of the chil-
dren or significantly impinge on the educational process." 25 In spite
17. 402 U.S. at 30. Before the desegregation order, the school board bused
children of all grades an average distance of fifteen miles. Id. at 30 n.12.
18. 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'd in part, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
19. 402 U.S. at 30.
20. Id. at 16.
21. 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
22. Id. at 37.
23. Id. at 28. De facto segregation is constitutionally allowed. See Deal
v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
847 (1967); Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), afJ'd, 404
U.S. 1027 (1972); Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd,
324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). But there are
arguments that de facto segregation is causally related to earlier de jure seg-
regation. This may yet become an actionable violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The role of busing would then be expanded considerably. See Note, Civil
Rights v. Individual Liberty: Swann, and Other Monsters of Impetuous Justice,
5 IND. LEGAL F. 368, 372 (1972).
24. 402 U.S. at 24-26.
25. Id. at 30-31. Age is a primary factor to be considered in evaluating rea-
sonableness. Busing was rejected in Mims v. Duval County School Bd., 329 F.
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of these limitations, however, other courts have extended the remedy
by consolidating adjacent school districts and busing students through-
out the unified district.! ,
The objections to busing are numerous.27 The most basic stems
from the familiar criticism that the Supreme Court is legislating in
areas that are better left to Congress.28 Implicit in "judicial legisla-
tion," such as court-ordered busing, are "result-oriented mandates
which impinge upon individual liberties."29 These abuses are magni-
fied by the vague guidelines provided in Swann .30 The most vocal
objections to busing, however, appear in defense of the "neighbor-
hood school" concept.-s1 Critics of busing argue that the health and
education of small children are endangered by long bus rides to un-
familiar surroundings, frequently in unsafe ghetto areas.3 2 Further-
Supp. 123, 133 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971), because it
involved excessive travel time.
26. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th
Cir. 1972).
27. See generally 118 Coxo. REc. H7792-7867 (1972); U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADx. NEws, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1080-84 (1972) in which President Nixon
articulates most of the objections to busing. Other criticisms are less rational:
But if by busing you mean that heartless and inhuman doctrine whereby
young people-infants, mere babes-are snatched from their mother's bosoms
against their will to be hauled like cattle from before the break of dawn
until after dark over countless miles to strange surroundings far from their
own neighborhoods and playmates for the mere purpose of satisfying some
sociologist's statistical need-then I oppose it.
118 CoNG. REc. H7836 (daily ed. August 17, 1972) (remarks by Rep. William
Hungate, D. Mo.).
28. See generally A. BIcEEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1970); P. KURLAND, POLrrrcS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
WARREN COURT (1970).
29. Civil Rights v. Individual Liberty: Swann, and Other Monsters of Impet-
uous Justice, supra note 23, at 368. See also Watt, The Divine Right of Govern-
ment by Judiciary, 14 U. CH. L. REv. 409 (1947).
30. The Supreme Court admitted in Swann I that: "The scope of permis-
sible transportation of students as an implement of a remedial decree has never
been defined... with precision." 402 U.S. at 29. Dissatisfaction with this vague-
ness is reflected in the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972, § 3(a), H.R.
13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (reprinted at note 119 infra). See also May,
supra note 13, at 903-08.
31. See U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMI. NEws, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1080-84 (1972)
(President Nixon's message to Congress, March 17, 1972).
32. To the proponents of busing this argument is hypocritical. Had blacks
not been segregated, more money might have been spent on improving the
quality of ghetto schools and making the neighborhood schools safer. Such an
argument against busing begs the ultimate questions. Busing adherents also point
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more, massive busing is expensive and prevents school boards from
spending tax money on better education. Similarly, it is argued that
pupils are forced to spend less time in class and more time in buses.
The arguments in favor of busing, set forth in Swann I, are reflected
in existing law and rely on tested principles of equity and constitu-
tional law. The objections, however, are largely sociological and
philosophical and rest on values, such as neighborhood schools, not
yet protected or even recognized by the federal judiciary.
To correct what is viewed as an imbalance in the "reconciliation
of competing values," 33 Congress has extended its existing prohibi-
tions against court-ordered busing by supplementing Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, with the anti-busing provisions of the Edu-
cational Amendments Act of 1972.34 Although numerous other anti-
busing bills, some considerably more drastic, have been introduced,
only two, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 197231 and
the Student Transportation Moratorium Act of 1972,36 have received
widespread support. Clearly, it appears that in the future, Congress
and the judiciary will have to reconcile their "competing" solutions
to the problem of school desegregation. The constitutional authority
by which Congress could enact more restrictive, alternative solutions
is, however, not altogether dear.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
A. Separation of Powers
Perhaps no principle of constitutional law is so basic, yet so inca-
pable of exact definition, as that of separation of powers. The
Supreme Court has, on occasion, defined the outer limits of the
out that busing is actually safer than walking to schools in the neighborhood. In
1968-69, the accident rate for boys riding buses per 100,000 was 0.03 compared
to 0.09 for boys who walked. Girls who were bused had an accident rate of 0.03
compared to 0.07 for those who walked. 118 CoNG. REC. H7806 (daily ed. August
17, 1972) (Rep. Mitchell). In 1970-71 43.5% or 19,000,000 of the pupils in the
United States were bused to School. Id. at H7834 (Rep. Celler). Only 3% of
children bused were bused under court order. 118 CONG. REn. 115415 (daily ed.
June 18, 1972) (Rep. Hawkins).
33. 402 U.S. at 31.
34. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (1972).
35. H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
36. H.R. 13,916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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powers exercised by the three branches of government.37 Yet the
existence of congressional power to interfere with inherent equitable
remedies is not dear.
1 Inherent Powers of Equity
The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts by the
Constitution is the same as that of the English Courts of Chancery
that existed in 1776.38 Implicit in the adoption of English equity
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court is the constitutional recogni-
tion of the inherent powers of equity. 9 The Supreme Court early
recognized that chancery jurisdiction is "inherent and original." 40
37. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (judicial control
over Congress); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(congressional control over presidential power); Ex parte McCardIe, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1869) (legislative control over court jurisdiction); Mississippi v.
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (judicial power over the executive).
38. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939); Atlas Life
Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939); Matthews v. Rodgers,
284 U.S. 521, 529 (1932); Borer v. Chapman, 119 U.S. 587, 600 (1887);
Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582, 592 (1859); Meade v. Beale, 16 F. Gas. 1283, 1291 (No. 9371)
(C.C. Md. 1850) (Taney, C.J., Circuit Justice). See also T. SPELLING & J.
Lzwis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING INJUNCTIONS (1926) [hereinafter
cited as SPELLING & LEwis]: "Where a constitution vests in certain courts juris-
diction of cases in equity and at law without reservation, they become vested with
the jurisdiction as an entirety according to the course of the common law, and as
defined and applied in practice, since the origin thereof in England." Id. at 5.
39. See, e.g., Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 533 (1850);
Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 222 (1809). See also Miles Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Seignious, 30 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.S.C. 1939), where the court
stated:
A statute normally creates or defines a right, it may or may not provide
a remedy; but the courts are never powerless to enforce a right because of
doubt as to the nature of a just remedy. The entire process of injunction in
equity, and in fact the courts of chancery themselves, first grew out of the
inability of courts of common law of England to grant appropriate relief
in certain cases, thereby suggesting to litigants, who were possessed of a right
without a remedy, to apply to the King for relief; and thereupon the King
delegated to his chancellor the power to grant equitable remedies, including
injunction. When any right exists, and ... is without adequate remedy at law,
he has the privilege of seeking equitable relief, and this is true regardless of
whether the right has its origins in the common law, or in a statute. The
power to administer injunctive relief stems back to the peculiar origin and
development of the courts of chancery; it is not ordinarily a statutory grant
of power to the court.
Id. at 555.
40. Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 536 (1850). For a more
contemporary statement see Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398
(1946).
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Indeed, in Swann I the Supreme Court remarked that "a district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth
and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." 41
The inherent powers of equity can, undoubtedly, be enlarged. As
early as 1850 it was recognized that Congress could create a "new
power from legislation for the court to act upon particular subjects
of a like kind as occasions for doing so may occur." 42 A statute may
also create "extraordinary" jurisdiction allowing injunctive relief
where it was not previously allowed, even in equity.43
Some statutes, however, merely recognize and codify the inherent
equitable powers, such as the All Writs Act 44 which provides that
federal courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and prin-
ciples of law."45 Similarly, the Bankruptcy Act 4a created courts of
bankruptcy with "the power to issue an injunction when necessary to
prevent the defeat or impairment of ... jurisdiction ... inherent...
in a duly established court of equity."47 In the context of school
desegregation, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 authorized injunctions to
redress violations of constitutional rights.48 Other statutes go beyond
mere codification and specify the manner of issuance of injunctions.49
Statutes affecting the equity jurisdiction of federal courts, however,
41. 402 U.S. at 15.
42. Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 536 (1850). See also W.
WALSH), A TREATISE ON EQUrrY 49-50 (1930).
43. 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 536. See also Grand Rapids & I.R. Co. v. Sparrow,
36 F. 210 (W.D. Mich. 1888).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1948).
45. Id. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.,
294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935); United States v. Louisiana, 229 F. Supp. 14, 17
(W.D. La. 1964).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
47. Continental Ill. Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294
U.S. 648, 675 (1935).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1875) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. (emphasis
added).
49. See, e.g., The Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1948).
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are to be strictly construed.50 Courts may not be stripped of their
equity powers by implication,51 nor may the
[Cjomprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction ... be denied
or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command.
Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescap-
able inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full
scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.5 2
Equity jurisdiction is properly invoked and its injunctive relief
becomes appropriate when there is no adequate remedy at law. 53 To
be adequate, the legal remedy must be "speedy, plain, and complete
[and] not an impracticable or theoretical remedy which does not rea-
sonably and fairly meet the situation to accomplish the purposes of
justice."5 In accordance with these standards, equitable remedies are
frequently and justifiably used in school desegregation cases such as
Swann I. Moreover, if equity has jurisdiction over a certain type of
50. SPELLING & LEWis 63. See J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 227-
29 (3d ed. 1905).
31. United States v. Fletcher, 8 F. Supp. 233, 235 (D. Id. 1934).
52. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398. The power of Con-
gress to restrict equitable remedies is considered more fully, infra. Note that the
Supreme Court required a valid statute and speaks only of jurisdiction. The
distinction between jurisdiction and equitable powers exercised within that juris-
diction is not always clear. See Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 278 (1924). Con-
gress could withdraw jurisdiction to hear school desegregation cases, leaving the
state courts jurisdiction. But it is perhaps a different thing to tell the courts they
may hear a certain type of case but cannot decide it in a certain manner. Con-
greys may indeed have this power, but strictly speaking it is not an exercise of
jurisdictional control, but rather, of its control over judicial remedies.
53. For a general discussion of this requirement in the context of equity's
history see R. MEGARRY & P. BAKER, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3-36 (1954);
SPLLLINO & LnWis 26-52; W. WALSH, supra note 42, at 41-95.
54. Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550,
557 (8th Cir. 1931). Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted
in 1938, this principle was reflected in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept.
24. 1789, ch. 20, < 16, 1 Stat. 73, which read: "(S]uits in equity shall not be
had at law." Although this statute %%as superseded in 1939 by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which abolished distinctions between law and equity, and
,epcaled in 1948, it was merely declarative of the rule already existing. See
Kellogg v. Schaueble, 273 F. 1012, 1019 (S.D. Mv'iss. 1921); Grauman v. City of
New York, 31 F. Supp. 172, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
55. In Swann I the Supreme Court noted: "As with any equity case, the
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy. In default by the
school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district
court has broad powers to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school
system." 402 U.S. at 16.
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case, the subsequent creation of an adequate legal remedy will not
deprive equity of its original jurisdiction.08 State legislation, of course,
may not affect a federal court's equitable powers of jurisdiction at
all.57 In any event, the equity court makes its own determination of
adequacy58 and resolves any doubts in favor of its jurisdiction.69
There is also considerable authority that the powers of a federal
court to issue injunctions can be restricted to some degree. There is
nothing so inherent in the powers of equity that a statute may not
limit its powers.60 Pomeroy has stated that:
If the statute is expressly prohibitory upon the equity courts, or
if it shows a clear and certain intent that the equitable jurisdic.
tion is no longer to be exercised over the matters within the scope
of the enactment, then such jurisdiction of equity in the partic-
ular class of cases must be considered as virtually abrogated.61
2. Regulatory Power of Congress
It is well settled that Congress has power to limit or remove juris-
diction of the federal courts.62 Article III, section one of the Constitu-
tion provides that: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."1' 3 This is sup-
plemented by section two which provides that "Mhe supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
56. Kellogg v. Schaueble, 273 F. 1012, 1018 (S.D. Miss. 1921); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 135 F. Supp. 304, 307 (S.D. Miss.
1955). But in Illinois Central there is dictum that Congress can subsequently
change the original jurisdiction of equity. 135 F. Supp. at 307. For a thorough
explanation of concurrent jurisdiction see J. PODuEROY, supra note 50, at 226-30.
57. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 106 (1945); Missis-
sippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 204 (1893); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106,
114 (1891). See generally Morse, The Substantive Equity Historically Applied
by the U.S. Courts, 54 DicK. L. Rnv. 10 (1949).
58. Schaefer v. Gunzburg, 246 F.2d 11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 831
(1957).
59. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 135 F. Supp. 304,
307 (S.D. Miss. 1955).
60. J. PoasnRoy, supra note 50, at 229.
61. Id.
62. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) 441 (1850). Congress could abolish all lower federal courts so long
as it left the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court intact. See C. WmRer,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (2d ed. 1970).
63. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Exception, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."64
By these provisions, Congress can expand, to a limited extent, or re-
strict the jurisdiction of all federal courts to hear certain kinds of
cases and can make their jurisdiction exclusive of, or concurrent with,
that of state courts.65 Professor Bork of Yale University has even
suggested that Congress could completely remove the jurisdiction of
lower federal courts to issue busing decrees.66
Just as Congress can create substantive rights under its Article I
powers, it may also create, modify or destroy remedies under its
Article III powers as it has, in fact, done in several situations by
denying injunctive relief.67 For example, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
193268 restricted the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions
in labor disputes, purportedly as a limitation on jurisdiction.69 Sim-
ilarly, in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,70 Congress pro-
vided that only an Emergency Court of Appeals had equity jurisdic-
tion to restrain enforcement of other provisions of the Act. Sig-
nificantly, neither statute completely restricted the right to issue in-
junctions, but only predicated its issuance upon certain requirements
or specified what court was to issue it. Furthermore, the courts were
not prevented from enjoining violations of constitutional rights.
Most efforts at regulation by Congress have restricted federal in-
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
65. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See R. BORK, CON-
STITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PROPOSALS, May 1972 (Special
Analysis No. 24 of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research)
[hereinafter cited as BORK]; C. WRIGHT, supra note 62. For general background
see R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARV. L. Rlv. 1362 (1953); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rnv. 157 (1960); Wechsler,
The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUm. L. RLv. 1001 (1965).
66. BORK 6. Professor Bork points out that this would still allow review by
the Supreme Court of busing orders issued by state courts. Id.
67. See generally H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 313-16 (1953) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER];
BORK 11-13.
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-16 (1932).
69. Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (constitutionality up-
held); United Elec. Coal Cos. v. Rice, 80 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
297 U.S. 714 (1936); Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union No.
591, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich. 1934).
70. 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
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junctions of state proceedings. The Anti-Injunction Act Tl forbids
federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings except under
certain circumstances. The Johnson Act of 193472 precludes a federal
court from enjoining state rate-fixing orders when several conditions
are met, including the existence of an adequate legal or equitable
remedy under state law. Similarly, the Tax Injunction Act of 193713
prevents a federal court from enjoining the collection of state taxes
so long as there is an adequate remedy in state courts. Under the
latter two statutes, injunctive relief is barred to the extent that there
is an adequate remedy under state law, even though the federal
equity courts might otherwise have jurisdiction because the federal
legal remedy is inadequate.74 These statutory limitations could be
viewed, however, as attempts to restore the balance of federalism
existing before Ex parte Young,5 in which the Supreme Court per-
mitted a federal injunction against a state official. 70 An "incidental
impairment" of injunctive power is certainly justified by the counter-
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948) provides: "A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or
to protect or effectuate its judgments."
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1934) provides:
[T]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of,
or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility
and made by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State
political subdivision, where:
(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance
of the order to the Federal Constitution; and,
(2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and,
(3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and
(4) A plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1937) provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law
when a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State."
74. HART & WECHSLER 855-57. These statutes overturn, within their limited
scope, the long-accepted principle that a federal court of equity may act when
the federal legal remedy is inadequate irrespective of what relief state courts might
give. See Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 569 (1939);
Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 135 F. Supp. 304, 307 (S.D. Miss. 1955).
75. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
76. Id. Injunctions ordering busing, however, are similarly directed against
state officials.
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vailing need to preserve the federal system.77 Whether similar sub-
ordinating interests exist to justify anti-busing statutes may be de-
terminative of their constitutionality. The Supreme Court, however,
purported to consider such possibilities in Swann I when it upheld
busing.78
The foregoing limitations on injunctive power have usually been
justified under the theory that in "[e]xercising this control of practice
and procedure the Congress is not confined to traditional forms or
traditional remedies." 79 These anti-injunction statutes, involve stat-
utory rights created by Congress, not civil rights guaranteed by the
Constitution which do not depend upon Congress for their existence
and likewise cannot be taken away by legislation." This exemplifies
the fundamental distinction between legal rights and constitutional
rights. Implicit in this distinction is the recognition that the "power
to issue an injunction is not necessarily within the class of inherent
attributes" of a court of equity8' One lower federal court has said
in dictum that Congress may destroy remedies if there is not an
"absolute constitutional right to have a federal court take jurisdic-
tion." = Another federal court,83 and a state court 4 as well, has held
that an equitable remedy cannot be denied unless the legislature
77. Goldberg, The Administration's Anti-Busing Proposals-Politics Makes Bad
Law, 67 Nw. U.L. R.v. 319, 355 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg]. See
also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. International Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
U.S. 281 (1970).
78. 402 U.S. at 16.
79. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (upholding
the constitutionality of declaratory judgments).
80. See notes 68, 70, 71, 72, and 73 supra and accompanying text. The right
to equal educational opportunities to be provided by the state is a good example
of such a constitutional right. Certainly, Congress could not authorize segregated
schools through its legislation. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
n.10 (1966).
81. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F.2d 284, 287 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 288.
83. Versluis v. Town of Haskell, 154 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1946); Meyer v.
City of Eufaula, 154 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1946). Both cases require that the new
remedy be only "substantially equivalent" to the old and noted that this is
measured by the "law of equivalents and not absolutes." Neither case, however,
involved the denial of injunctive power.
84. Lougee v. New Mexico Bureau of Revenue Comm'r, 42 N.M. 115, 76
P.2d 6 (1937). The state constitution, however, contained a specific provision
that was relied upon in reaching this result.
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substitutes an adequate legal remedy. Other federal courts have held
that Congress can limit equitable rights except for those arising under
the Constitution, 5 and that Congress may not dilute constitutional
rights under the guise of jurisdictional regulation.86 The only state-
ment to this effect by the Supreme Court, however, is in the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Rutledge in Yakus v. United States:87
It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is en-
tirely another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in a
manner inconsistent with constitutional requirements or, what in
some instances may be the same thing, without regard to them
.... There are limits to the judicial power .... But whenever
the judicial power is called into play, it is responsible directly
to the fundamental law and no other authority can intervene to
force or authorize the judicial body to disregard it. The problem
therefore is not solely one of individual right or due process of
law. It is equally one of... the powers of government and ...
of the judicial process .... 81
A basic issue, then, to be determined under anti-injunction legisla-
tion, is whether a particular type of injunctive order is a remedy or a
right.89 Professor Bork believes that busing orders are merely a dis-
cretionary remedy and not a constitutional right. 90 Goldberg, how-
ever, maintains that there is no right-remedy distinction in deseg-
regation cases.91 Indeed, in North Carolina State Board of Education
v. Swann (Swann 11)92 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
state statute completely prohibiting busing on account of race and
noted that "bus transportation has long been an integral part of all
public educational systems, and it is unlikely that a truly effective
remedy could be devised without continued reliance upon it.'°3
The precise nature of constitutional limitations of the exercise of
jurisdictional control is unclear. In Ex parte McCardle94 the Supreme
85. In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198, 206 (N.D.
Ohio 1935).
86. Peterson v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
87. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
88. Id. at 468.
89. 52 BosToN U.L. REv. 321, 322 n.8 (1972).
90. Bonn 14.
91. Goldberg 359.
92. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
93. Id. at 46.
94. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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Court recognized the congressional power to take away part of the
federal court's jurisdiction25 Shortly thereafter, in United States v.
Klein, '1 the Court retreated from this position and held an attempted
withdrawal of jurisdiction unconstitutional because it infringed on
executive and judicial functionsY7
It has been suggested that the "exceptions" clause of Article III
cannot be used to destroy the "essential role of the Supreme Court
in the constitutional plan." '9 s This view has some support in Ex parte
Yerger," in which the Supreme Court upheld its power to issue
original writs of certiorari and habeas corpus, in spite of a congres-
sional withdrawal of such jurisdiction100 Indeed, Marbury v. Madi-
son's' established that the Supreme Court, not Congress, is the ulti-
mate arbiter of the Constitution. ° 2 Furthermore, the very nature of
the judicial power requires that its judgments and constitutional
determinations be enforceable103 If the McCardle case were construed
broadly, Congress could destroy the very concept of judicial review. 04
For this reason, Professor Bork disapproves of anti-busing legisla-
tion based on McCardle and the "exceptions" clause; it poses a threat
to judicial review and encourages a confrontation between the legisla-
ture and the judiciary. 05 Other writers have even suggested that the
95. Id. at 513-14.
96. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). The Court never distinguished or even
mentioned McCardle. Justice Douglas, in a dissent to Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962), later remarked, "[T]here is a serious question
whether the McCardle case could command a majority view today."
97. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
98. HART & WECHSLER 312. See also Hart, supra note 65; Merry, Scope of
the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REv.
53 (1962); Ratner, supra note 65.
99. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
100. Id. at 102-03.
101. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
102. Id. at 177.
103. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) (contempt power of the courts cannot be com-
pletely abrogated) ; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (federal
courts cannot give advisory opinions in the form of judgments that cannot be en-
forced). See also Goldberg 336.
104. BORx 7. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 23. To prevent such an occur-
rence, former Justice Roberts proposed a constitutional amendment guaranteeing
jurisdiction of constitutional cases. See Roberts, Now is the Time: Fortifying the
Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949).
105. BORK 8.
155
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
"exceptions" power cannot bar access to judicial protection of consti-
tutional rights. Tm If busing orders are essential to the enforcement
of fourteenth amendment rights, any statute restricting such orders
might be unconstitutional unless anothei source of congressional
power can be found.
B. Section Five Powers
The balance of power existing under Article III may have been
altered by section five of the fourteenth amendment which provides:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article."'107 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this section and its counterpart, section two of the fifteenth
amendment, to be watersheds of congressional power. In South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbachlos the Court held that Congress, in enforcing the
fifteenth amendment, was not limited to merely forbidding violations
of the amendment in general terms but could regulate state voting
procedures, an area previously reserved to the states. 0 The same
standard was applied to the fourteenth amendment in United States
v. Guest," in which the Court held that Congress could make the
fourteenth amendment applicable to private individuals through its
enforcement legislation.'" But the most startling development was
Katzenbach v. Morgan."2 In Morgan, section 4 (e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965"13 was attacked on grounds that Congress had
exceeded its section five powers.1 4 The Act provided that Puerto
Rican citizens could not be deprived of their voting rights if they
met certain Spanish literacy requirements."05 This congressional
attempt at enforcement of the equal protection clause conflicted with
a New York state statute denying citizens the right to vote if they
106. P. BFRGER, supra note 65; 52 BoSTON U.L. Rav. 321, 324, 326 (1972).
107. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
108. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
109. Id. at 327, 337.
110. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
111. Id. at 762, 782. The majority holding this view is expressed in the con-
curring opinions of Justices Clark and Brennan. The opinion of the Court is in
the minority on this issue.
112. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1965).
114. 384 U.S. at 648.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1965).
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were not proficient in English."1 6 In upholding the constitutionality
of the federal statute, the Court held that:
Section 4 (e) may be readily seen as "plainly adapted to fur-
thering these aims of the Equal Protection Clause. ... It was
well within congressional authority to say that this need of the
Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion
upon any state interests served by the English literacy require-
ment. It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judg-
ment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations
... . It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of
these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis
upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.""
This statement, if left unqualified, would seem to make Congress a
co-partner in constitutional interpretation. Indeed, one writer has
interpreted Morgan as exempting section five legislation from the
principles of judicial review set forth in Marbury v. Madison."Ls
Implied in this exception, if indeed it is one, is the judicial rec-
ognition of Congress' superior fact-finding ability which enables it
to assess conflicting information and determine what measures will
best enforce the fourteenth amendment.1 9 It follows that the con-
116. 384 U.S. at 644-45.
117. Id. at 652-53.
118. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP. CT.
REV. 81, 84.
119. Bork 11. Congress has made such a determination in the Equal Edu-
cational Opportunities Act of 1972, § 3(a), H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), which provides:
The Congress finds that-(1) the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned
to schools solely on the basis of race, color, or national origin denies to
those students the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment;(2) the abolition of dual school systems has been virtually completed and
great progress has been made and is being made toward the elimination of
the vestiges of those systems;(3) for the purpose of abolishing dual school systems and eliminating the
vestiges thereof, many local educational agencies have been required to re-
organize their school systems, to reassign students, and to engage in the
extensive transportation of students;(4) the implementation of desegregation plans that require extensive stu-
dent transportation has, in many cases, required local educational agencies
to expend large amounts of funds, thereby depleting their financial resources
available for the maintenance or improvement of the quality of educational
facilities and instruction provided;(5) excessive transportation of students creates serious risks to their
heal and safety, disrupts the educational process carried out with respect
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gressional determination is valid even though the Supreme Court
might not find the same facts to be a violation of the amendment.12 0
It has been suggested that the determination of the necessity of bus-
ing and the degree to which it would be used are the types of issues
that are best resolved by Congress through its fact-finding powers.12'
The mandate given to Congress by Morgan, however, is not with-
out limitation. In his dissent, Justice Harlan warned that unless the
congressional enforcement power was predicated on a prior judicial
determination of a violation of the equal protection clause, Congress
could dilute the fourteenth amendment in addition to expanding
it.22 In response to this criticism, the majority, in a footnote to its
opinion, stated:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent... § 5 does not grant
Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and
to enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and
due process decisions of this court." We emphasize that Congress'
power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example,
an enactment authorizing the States to establish racially seg-
regated systems of education would not be-as required by §5
-a measure to "enforce" the Equal Protection Clause since ta
clause of its own force prohibits such state laws."al
to such students, and impinges significantly on their educational opportunity;
(6) the risks and harms created by excessive transportation are partic-ularly great for children enrolled in the first six grades; and
(7) the guidelines provided by the courts for fashioning remedies to dis-
mantle dual school systems have been, as the Supreme Court of the United
States has said, "incomplete and imperfect," and have failed to establish a
clear, rational and uniform standard for determining the extent to which
a local educational agency is required to reassign and transport its students
in order to eliminate the vestiges of a dual school system.
120. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CQw.
L. REv. 199, 228 (1971). Professor Cox has suggested that Congress could make
de facto segregation illegal or enact a uniform code of criminal procedure for the
states, even though the Supreme Court has not held these determinations to be
constitutionally required. See Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and
the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 108 (1966). Former Jus-
tice Goldberg, however, has suggested that Congress may not freeze the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment and that the Supreme Court can still expand its
meaning. Goldberg 343 n.127. Consider, however, that this view presupposes that
Congress can only restate or expand the scope of the amendment, leaving its final
interpretation to the Supreme Court. If Congress can restrict its scope, it would
be anomalous if the Court could expand it at the same time.
121. BORK 11, 16.
122. 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 651-52 n.10.
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Professor Cox, however, considers this footnote to be something of
an afterthought that cannot overcome the logic of the main body
of the opinion: "It is hard to see how the Court can consistently give
weight to the congressional judgment in expanding the definition of
equal protection in the area of human rights but refuse to give it
weight in narrowing the definition where the definition depends upon
appraisal of the facts."12- 4 Professor Bork has further suggested that
Congress could restrict constitutional rights guaranteed by the equal
protection clause, but only if the right depends on a "judgment of
diverse facts and competing values."12 Other critics have interpreted
Aorgan as recognizing only a "congressional revisory authority" with
power to redefine constitutional standards to a limited, but uncer-
tain extent.'21 Thus, the Court could uphold "reforms" and strike
down restrictions, depending on its own independent characteriza-
tion of the legislation.127 Similarly, it has been suggested that Title
11 of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968128 could be viewed as
a constitutional exercise of section five powers. 29
Other interpretations of Morgan offer different resolutions of the
footnote with its accompanying text. The Supreme Court's deferral
to Congress might only be temporary so as to afford a reasonable
time for congressional remedies to prove their effectiveness30 An-
other view takes the Morgan footnote literally and regards the equal
protection clause as an "irreducible minimum."'' s Even Professor
Cox has recently admitted that the Supreme Court's role in the en-
forcement of constitutional rights, at least arguably, might not permit
a congressional dilution of the fourteenth amendment. 32 Moreover,
the most recent statement of section five powers in Oregon v.
124. Cox, Foreword, supra note 120, at 106 n.86.
125. BoRK 11. Professor Bork confesses, however, that this approach does not
mitigate the holding in Morgan since most constitutional judgments involve di-
verse facts.
126. Burt, supra note 118, at 121.
127. Id.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1968).
129. Burt, supra note 118, at 132.
130. 52 BOSTON U.L. R~v. 321, 325 (1972). This approach, however, would
be inconsistent with Green and Alexander to the extent that these decisions re-
quire immediate implementation of Brown I.
131. Id. at 328-29.
132. Cox, The Role of Congres,, supra note 120, at 250, 254.
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Mitchell 33 seems to uphold the Morgan footnote. In Mitchell, the
Court held that the section of the Voting Rights Act of 1970 that
lowered the voting age in state elections 4 was an invalid exercise
of section five powers since there was no substantial evidence that
states utilized age requirements to discriminate in violation of the
equal protection clause.'m In reaching this decision, the Court re-
marked in dictum that:
As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not un-
limited. ,Specifically, there are at least three limitations upon
Congress' power to enforce the guarantees of the Civil War
Amendments. First, Congress may not by legislation repeal other
provisions of the Constitution. Second, the power granted to
Congress was not intended to strip the States of their power ....
Third, Congress may only "enforce" the Provisions of the amend-
ments and may do so only by "appropriate le gislation." Con-
gress has no power under the enforcement sections to undercut
the amendments' guarantees of Personal equality and freedom
from discrimination . .. .36
Even this more recent statement, however, may not be entirely con-
sistent with the logic of Morgan. Nevertheless, to whatever extent
this view is correct, anti-busing legislation might be a dilution of
equal protection if busing orders are proven to be essential to the
enforcement of that clause.
Professor Bork does not rely on Morgan to justify anti-busing
legislation because that decision improperly turns section five powers
into a "general police power for the nation."13 Instead, he maintains
that section five "taken at the minimum weight that must be allotted
it, confirms and reinforces Congress' historic power to deal with
remedies employed by federal courts."1 3 This legislative control is
analogous to that conferred on Congress by the exceptions clause of
Article III except that it is derived from section five. Under this
theory, congressional power over remedies would seem almost limit-
less. Professor Cox has even remarked, "it seems irrelevant whether
133. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb-1 (1970). This statute was followed by the twenty-
sixth amendment in 1972, rendering such legislation unnecessary.
135. 400 U.S. at 130. The dissent felt there was sufficient evidence of dis.-
crimination to support enforcement legislation. Id. at 240.
136. Id. at 128-29 (emphasis added).
137. BoRK 10.
138. Id. at 11.
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the relief is greater or lesser than the courts would order. In either
event the relief is not part of the Constitution."1 39 But if there is
only one remedy by which a constitutional right may be protected,
denial of that remedy under the guise of enforcing the equal protec-
tion clause might well be a violation of due process. 140 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has already recognized in Swann II11 that busing may
be indispensable.
C. Due Process Limitations
Whenever Congress exceeds its constitutional powers to enact
legislation the resulting statute may be unreasonable and thereby
violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.142 If Congress
enacted anti-busing legislation but violated the separation of powers
doctrine or exceeded its enforcement powers under section five, the
application of the resulting statutes would violate due process. But
even if Congress' legislative power were upheld, it is arguable that
application of anti-busing statutes might violate the fifth amend-
ment because they might destroy the only effective remedy in that
particular desegregation suit.143
It is well established that Congress may destroy or restrict rem-
edies.1t In Gibbes v. Zimmerman,145 the Supreme Court held that
a state statute prohibiting the equitable appointment of a receiver
in certain situations did not violate due process because there is "no
property [right], in the constitutional sense, in any particular form
of remedy; all that.., is guaranteed by the Fourteenth amendment
is the preservation of his substantial right to redress by some effec-
139. Cox, The Role of Congress, supra note 120, at 259.
140. 52 BosToN U.L. R~v. 321, 324 (1972); HART & WECHSLER 318, 332,
334.
141. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
142. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934):
[T]he function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate
the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority
- If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary or discriminatory, the require-
ments of due process are satisfied ....
Id. at 536-37.
143. 52 BoSTON U.L. Rav. 321, 324 (1972).
144. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
145. 290 U.S. 326 (1933).
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tive procedure."'' 46 Similarly, the due process clause restricts the con-
trol of Congress over the federal courts' jurisdiction. 47 If busing is
essential to elimination of segregated schools, the denial of that
remedy or substitution of an inadequate alternative might violate
the standards of Zimmerman. One critic of anti-busing laws has
suggested that desegregation must be immediately effective in order
to comply with Green and Alexander.48 So long as this standard
prevails, it can be soundly argued that any remaining desegregation
remedies must be equally immediate or due process may be denied.
Indeed, Swann 11 indicates that effective desegregation without bus-
ing may well be impossible.149
Even though busing orders have been issued to enforce the equal
protection clause, which applies only to the states, the federal gov-
ernment is held to similar standards by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. In Boiling v. SharpesO the Supreme Court held
that the due process clause embodied some of the principles of equal
protection. It would therefore be anomolous to hold the states to a
higher standard of desegregation than the federal government. Since
the Court in Swann 11 declared state anti-busing laws unconstitu-
tional, the due process clause of the fifth amendment may arguably
require the same result with regard to federal anti-busing legisla-
tion.15' Thus the basic issue to be resolved with regard to due process,
as with other constitutional limitations is: how essential is busing to
the immediate desegregation of public schools?
III. THF CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
The foregoing constitutional standards reveal that the powers of
Congress to restrict injunctive orders in desegregation cases are so
146. Id. at 332. See also Swanson v. Bates, 170 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948);
Bowles v. Miller, 151 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1945); Ritholz v. March, 105 F.2d
937 (D.C. Cir. 1939). Hart and Wechsler suggest that due process requires that
the courts always be open to pass on constitutional claims. HART & WEOHSLER
317-18.
147. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
148. Goldberg 331, 349. See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.
149. 402 U.S. at 46.
150. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
151. Goldberg 331-32. It is not clear, however, that Swann II was based on
equal protection. The decision could arguably be based on the supremacy clause
because of a conflict between the state statute and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra
note 48.
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uncertain that the constitutionality of anti-busing legislation is, at
best, speculative. Even if these statutes were held to be constitutional
on their face, they may well be unconstitutional in their application
to given desegregation plans.
A. Degrees of Prohibition
1. Limitations on Expansion
Congress has attempted to restrict the expansion of busing orders
by limiting the remedy to violations of existing constitutional stand-
ards.',- Such restrictions are necessarily futile since the federal courts
determine the scope of constitutional rights and the existence of
violations of those rights., The earliest such attempt was Title IV
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) which defined "desegregation"
as the "assignment of students to public schools and within such
schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin,
but 'desegregation' shall not mean the assignment of students to
public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance."' 1 4 Further-
more, the Act provided that:
[Njothing herein shall empower any official or court of the
United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial
balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils
or students from one school to another or one school district to
another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise
enlarge the existing power of the court to insure compliance
with constitutional standards.z5
These sections, however, were given a very limited interpretation in
Swann I. The Supreme Court held that Title IV was intended only
to "foreclose" the possibility of an expansion of existing equitable
powers1 13 Congress feared that other provisions of the CRA might
be interpreted as granting broader equitable powers to the federal
courts. Indeed, the legislative history reveals that Congress sought
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to c-9 (1964); 20 U.S.C. § 1653 (1972).
153. This has certainly been true in the past. The enforcement power of
Congress under section five of the fourteenth amendment may, however, permit
Congress to define the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation so
as to contradict Supreme Court decisions; anti-busing statutes construed in terms
of de jure and de facto segregation may take on new vitality.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1964).
155. Id. § 2000c-6 (emphasis added).
156. 402 U.S. at 17.
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only to limit court-ordered busing as a remedy for de facto segregation
because the Act did not create a cause of action for the existence of
de facto segregation.157
The Education Amendments Act of 1972 (EAA) restated this
provision of the CRA and added that it applied to all public school
systems in all sections of the country.15 s Presumably, this restatement
is subject to the same construction given the CRA in Swann 1. The
EAA also cautioned that none of its provisions require court-ordered
busing 59 and prohibited the use of federal funds to assist the im-
plementation of busing orders, except under certain conditions. 00
As a result of Swann I these provisions are of little effect so long
as the courts remain within the limitations of the fourteenth amend-
ment. If the courts purported to order busing of school children as
a remedy for de facto segregation or to eliminate segregation that was
incorrectly classified as de jure, then the CRA and the EAA might
well be valid restrictions. There is not yet, however, a constitutional
right to the elimination of de facto segregation.101 If the Supreme
Court should expand the scope of de jure segregation and the lower
courts order busing to remedy what is now classified as de facto, these
anti-busing statutes might become completely meaningless. Clearly,
the force of these limitations depends on the distinction between de
jure and de facto segregation. Consequently, the Congress has not
created a true restriction on federal equity powers insofar as the
operative terms of the statutes are still the subject of judicial defini-
tion. Moreover, these statutes present no real constitutional issues
since they, in effect, only duplicate the refusal by the judidary to
remedy de facto segregation through busing or any other means.102
2. Temporary Restrictions
Congress has already enacted several temporary restrictions on the
issuance of busing orders in the EAA.63 Section 804 of the Act au-
thorizes parents or guardians to reopen or interfere in the further
157. See U.S. CODE CONG. & Ambr. Nnws, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2355 (1964).
158. 20 U.S.C. § 1656 (1972).
159. Id. § 1651.
160. Id. § 1652. The constitutionality of this provision is beyond the scope of
this paper. But see Goldberg 362-68.
161. See note 23 supra.
162. See note 153 supra.
163. See notes 164, 167, 170 and 171 infra and accompanying text.
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implementation of the court order if the time or distance of travel
is so great that it endangers the health of the student or interferes
in the educational process. 1 This section is not a true limitation on
valid busing orders. Swann I explicitly limits busing to those situa-
tions in which the health and education of children will not suffer.165
If a court has exceeded this judicial restriction, the reopening of the
order under this statute would not interfere with desegregation since
the court order would be invalid under Swann L Furthermore, the
section is temporary insofar as a reopening or intervention by parents
would only delay the implementation of a valid order later deter-
mined to be within the guidelines of Swann I. It is arguable that the
delay caused by a reopening or even that of an intervention before
judgment is a violation of due process because the unconstitutional
injury is prolonged.161 Since, however, the Supreme Court itself has
conditioned the legality of a busing order on its compliance with
standards of "reasonableness" it is proper that parents have the
opportunity to participate in the determination of what is reasonable.
A much more severe restriction is presented by section 803 of the
EAA which provides:
Notwithstanding any other law or provision of law, in the case
of any order on the part of any United States district court
which requires the transfer or transportation of any student or
students from any school attendance area prescribed by com-
petent State or local authority for the purposes of achieving a
balance among students with respect to race, sex, religion, or
socioeconomic status, the effectiveness of such order shall be
postponed until all appeals in connection with such order have
been exhausted or, in the event no appeals are taken, until the
time for such appeal has expired. This section shall expire at
midnight January 1, 1974.167
The time limitation severely restricts the applicability of this section.
It is apparent that Congress anticipated a permanent solution to the
busing issue by the expiration date. Even if no permanent anti-busing
law is enacted by January 1, 1974, the time may be extended or other
similar provisions enacted. The lower courts have so far managed to
avoid the application of section 803 by several means. One court
164. 20 U.S.C. § 1654 (1972).
165. 402 U.S. at 30-31.
166. See Goldberg 332.
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1653 (1972).
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has held that the section applies only prospectively, even though the
legislative history is uncertain in that respect.110 Another has avoided
the section on grounds that the busing order in question was based
on a school board proposal and only "approved" by the district
court.1 69
A provision similar to section 803 of the EAA is section 403 (b)
(2) of the original Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972
(EEOA) .170 Like section 808 it calls for a stay of district court bus-
ing orders. But unlike section 803, EEOA specifically applies to de
jure segregation cases. If the moratorium imposed by section 803
were interpreted to apply in de jure situations, it might be attacked
on the same grounds that section 403 (b) (2) of the original EEOA
and the more severe Student Transportation Moratorium Act of 1972
(STMA) are criticized.
The STMA provides that any court order requiring busing entered
after the statute's enactment, and before July 1, 1973, will be stayed
until that date to the extent the ordered busing was not previously
utilized by the school boards.17' Like section 803 of the EAA, this
168. Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 467 F.2d 59 (9th Cir.), application jor
stay denied, 409 U.S. 945 (1972).
169. Clark v. Board of Educ., 465 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
93 S. Ct. 3054 (1973).
170. Equal Educational Opportunities Act [hereinafter cited as EEOA] §
403(b) (2), H.R. 13,915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The original version was
introduced in the House of Representatives on March 20, 1972, by Rep. Mc-
Colluch (R. Ohio) and cosponsored by Rep. Ford (R. Mich.). An amended
version was passed by the House on August 18, 1972. Section 403(b)(2) reads
in part: "If a United States district court orders implementation of a plan re-
quiring an increase in transportation, . . . the appropriate court of appeals shall,
upon timely application by a defendant educational agency, grant a stay of such
order until it has reviewed such order."
171. Student Transportation Moratorium Act [hereinafter cited as STMA] §
3, H.R. 13,916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) provides:(a) During the period beginning with the day after the date of enactment
of this Act and ending with July 1, 1973, or the date of enactment oflegislation which the Congress declares to be that contemplated by section
2(a) (4), whichever is earlier, the implementation of any order of a court
of the United States entered during such period shall be stayed to the extent
it requires, directly or indirectly, a local educational agency-(1) to transport a student who was not being transported by such local
educational agency immediately prior to the entry of such order; or(2) to transport a student to or from a school to which or from which
such student was not being transported by such local educational agencyimmediately prior to the entry of such order.(b) During the period described in subsection (a) of this section, a local
educational agency shall not be required to implement a desegregation plan
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statute is shortlived since it contemplates permanent restrictions
on busing before its expiration date. 17 The time limits could easily
be extended by amendment or other moratoria enacted. But unlike
section 803, STMA imposes a stay on the implementation of all
orders for a specific time. Section 803 stays orders only while an ap-
peal is pending. Significantly, STMA does not stay orders entered be-
fore enactment of the statutes and does not purport to deny district
courts the power to enter such orders. The purpose of STMA is to
preserve the status quo while Congress considers and enacts EEOA.
Professor Bork points out that Congress may do so only to the extent
that it can prohibit busing permanently. 73
Because STMA does not forbid busing orders it is obviously not
an exercise of jurisdictional control under Article I1. It is arguable
that state education and desegregation are proper subjects for federal
legislation under section five of the fourteenth amendment. But while
STMA is in effect, the rights secured by the equal protection clause
are arguably limited or diluted by the absence of forced transporta-
tion of students. As already suggested, resolution of this issue depends
on how essential busing is to equal protection rights. A better theory
in support of STMA is that a moratorium on busing orders is "neces-
sary and proper" to the essential regulation of remedies under Article
III on a more permanent basis.17 4 The case law in support of this
theory, however, is virtually nonexistent, except for Home Building
C Loan v. Blaisdell175 in which the Supreme Court upheld a Min-
submitted to a department or agency of the United States during such
period pursuant to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the extent
that such plan provides for such local educational agency to carry out any
action described in clauses (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section.(c) Nothing in this Act shall prohibit an educational agency from propos-
ing, adopting, requiring, or implementing any desegregation plan, other-
\wise lawful, that exceeds the limitations specified in subsection (a) of this
section, nor shall any court of the United States or department or agency
of the Federal Government be prohibited from approving implementation
of a plan that exceeds the limitations specified in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion if the plan is voluntarily proposed by the appropriate educational agency.
172. Id.
173. BORK 17.
174. Id.
175. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Mortgagees were forced to find remedies other than
foreclosure. This was attacked as violative of the contract clause, the due process
clause, and the equal protection clause. The Court upheld the moratorium, but
added that such legislation must be: 1) justified by an emergency; 2) appropriate
to that emergency; 3) temporary; 4) not unreasonable; and 5) a legitimate
legislative end. Id. at 444-48.
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nesota moratorium that extended the period of mortgage redemption
beyond the ordinary statutory period for a "just and equitable"
period. 76 Blaisdell is, at best, a weak precedent since it involved
economic regulation by a state in the midst of a depression and is
based on a distinction between contract rights and remedies not
present in the busing issue.Y77
It is not altogether certain, however, that a moratorium is neces-
sary and proper to the enactment of EEOA. Former Justice Goldberg
finds three infirmities in the theory.1 8 Section 2 (a) (5) of STMA
states that "there is a substantial likelihood" that interim busing
orders would exceed fourteenth amendment standards prescribed by
EEOA.1 9 "History, however, shows that, if anything, court orders
will fall short of judicial desegregation standards rather than exceed
them."''8 0 Furthermore, there is no need for a moratorium since
court orders may be reopened under EEOA, and orders exceeding
Swann I guidelines may be stayed by the Supreme Court.'81 More-
over, EEOA would permit residual busing levels in limited situations
while STMA would prohibit them altogether. 82 Whichever view is
correct, the constitutionality of such a moratorium would depend
on the ability of Congress to establish a factual need for the tem-
porary restrictions.' 83
Whether the moratorium created by EAA, and that proposed by
STMA and the original EEOA, are subject to due process objections
is also largely a factual determination. Speaking of STMA, former
Justice Goldberg stated that:
176. Id.
177. Goldberg 337.
178. Id. at 338-39.
179. STMA § 2(a) (5) provides:
The Congress finds that there is a substantial likelihood that, pending en-
actment of such legislation, many local educational agencies will be required
to implement desegregation plans that impose a greater obligation than re.
quired by the fourteenth amendment and permitted by such pending legisla.
tion and that these plans will require modification in light of the legislation's
requirements.
180. Goldberg 338-39.
181. Id. at 339.
182. Id.
183. BORK 19. Under such a burden, Congress might be expected to prove
that large expenditures of funds, administrative confusion, and inconvenience to
students and families would interfere in the educational process. In addition,
school systems would later have to "undo" the complicated efforts to comply
with orders that might have been stayed, had there been a moratorium.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/7
ANTI-BUSING LEGISLATION
[TMhis moratorium would stay busing which federal courts had
ordered as an indispensable element of effective and immediate
desegregation relief. By so delaying the implementation of a
remedy and prolonging the constitutional injury, Congress is
acting in aid of continued racial segregation and, therefore, irn
violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.184
There is considerable authority that stays of desegregation orders
should not be granted while appeals are pending unless the theory
of relief granted is genuinely novel and might easily be reversed.18s
How "indispensable" busing is to immediate desegregation is essen-
tially a factual issue that may not be capable of resolution in general
or universal terms.
3. Permanent Restrictions
The various moratoria temporarily restricting busing orders con-
template the passage of EEOA. Not all of this Act can be char-
acterized as an anti-busing statute, though that is its central feature.
Title H recites fundamental legal principles reflecting the congres-
sional interpretation of the equal protection clause.18 Title IV, how-
184. Goldberg 332.
185. To obtain a stay, the petitioner must generally show: 1) that he will
probably prevail on appeal; 2) that he will be irreparably injured if the stay
is denied; 3) that other parties to the suit will not be substantially harmed;
and 4) that a stay would advance the public interest. See Long v. Robinson,
432 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1970). Stays of district court injunctions in deseg-
regation cases are usually denied. See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S.
269 (1969) (stay denied); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S.
19 (1969) (stay denied); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist.,
419 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1969) (stay denied), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970); Bradley
v. Richmond School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), stay granted, 456 F.2d 6
(4th Cir.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
186. EEOA § 201 provides:
No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on ac-
count of his race, color, or national origin, by-
(a) the deliberate segregation by an educational agency of students on the
basis of race, color, or national origin among or within schools;
(b) the failure of an educational agency which has formerly practiced such
deliberate segregation to take affirmative steps, consistent with title IV of
this Act, to remove the vestiges of a dual school system;
(c) the assignment by an educational agency of a student to a school, other
than the one closest to his place of residence within the school district in
which he resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation
of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among the schools
of such agency than would result if such student were assigned to the school
closest to his place of residence within the school district of such agency
providing the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student;
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ever, deals with remedies and constitutes the permanent limitation
on busing orders. Significantly, no provision of the EEOA recites
that the Act is an exercise of jurisdictional control187
The substantive restrictions on Title IV are found in section 402,
which specifies the remedies available for desegregation, and in sec-
tion 403, which limits the extent to which section 402 may be im-
plemented through transportation. Briefly, section 402 provides that
a district court must consider specified remedies and apply them in
the order listed, if practical.' 88 The court must first assign students
to the appropriate school nearest their homes, considering school
capacities and physical obstacles. If this is impractical, assignment
should be made without regard to physical barriers. Should this be
unacceptable, the court must then consider, in the following order:
majority-to-minority transfers, creation or revision of attendance
zones, construction of new schools or closing of inferior schools, con-
struction of magnet schools, and any other plans "educationally sound
(d) discrimination by an educational agency on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in the employment, employment conditions, or assignments
to schools of its faculty or staff... ;(e) the transfer by an educational agency, whether voluntary or otherwise,
of a student from one school to another if the purpose and effect of such
transfer is to increase segregation of students on the basis of race, color, or
national origin among the schools of such agency; or
(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to over-
come barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instruc-
tional programs.
187. Equally significant, other statutes restricting equitable powers have in-
cluded such statements. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104,
107 (1970); Emergency Price Control Act, Act of Jan. 3, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(d),
56 Stat. 32-33.
188. EEOA § 402 provides:
In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or
a denial of the equal protection of the laws, which may involve directly or
indirectly the transportation of students, a court, department, or agency of
the United States shall consider and make specific findings on the efficacy
in correcting such denial of the following remedies and shall require imple-
mentation of the first of the remedies set out below, or on the first com-
bination thereof, which would remedy such denial:(a) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence
which provide the appropriate grade level and type of education for such
students, taking into account school capacities and natural physical barriers;(b) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence
which provide the appropriate grade level and type of education for such
students, taking into account only school capacities;
(c) permitting students to transfer from a school in which a majority of
the students are of their race, color, or national origin to a school in which
a minority of the students are of their race, color, or national origin;(d) the creation or revision of attendance zones or grade structures without
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and administratively feasible." 5 9 Implicit in this "checklist" is the
desire of Congress to insure that busing is never ordered until it is
absolutely necessary. 99 Section 402 may only be implemented, how-
ever, within the transportation restrictions of section 403. This sec-
tion of the amended EEOA is so severe, that the choices given the
courts by section 402 are diminished considerably.
The original section 403 (a) provided that no court may order
the busing of elementary students if such order would increase the
average daily travel (in time or distance) over the comparable aver-
ages for the preceding year or the average daily number of such
students who are presently bused. 91 Section 403 (b) applies the same
standards to secondary students, but allows increased busing if no
other method in section 402 would be adequate.192 Any such increase
exceeding the transportation limits set forth in section 403;(e) the construction of new schools or the closing of inferior schools;
(f) the construction or establishment of magnet schools or educational
parks; or
(g) the development and implementation of any other plan which is edu-
cationally sound and administratively feasible, subject to the provisions of
sections 403 and 404 of this Act.
189. Id.
190. BORK 22.
191. EEOA § 403(a) provides:
No court, department, or agency of the United States shall pursuant to
section 402, order the implementation of a plan that would require an in-
crease for any school year in-
(1) either the average daily distance to be traveled by, or the average
daily time of travel for, all students in the sixth grade or below transported
by an educational agency over the comparable averages for the preceding
school year; or
(2) the average daily number of students in the sixth grade or below trans-
ported by an educational agency over the comparable average for the pre-
ceding school year, disregarding the transportation of any student which
results from a change in such student's residence, his advancement to a
higher level of education, or his attendance at a school operated by an edu-
cational agency for the first time.
192. EEOA § 403(b) provides in part:
No court, department, or agency of the United States shall, pursuant to
section 402, order the implementation of a plan which would require an
increase for any school year in-(I ) either the average daily distance to be traveled by, or the average
daily time of travel for, all students in the seventh grade or above trans-
ported by an educational agency over the comparable averages for the pre-
ceding school year; or
(2) the average daily number of students in the seventh grade or above
transported by an educational agency over the comparable average for the
preceding school year, disregarding the transportation of any student which
results from a change in such student's residence, his advancement to a
higher level of education, or his attendance at a school operated by an edu-
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is only temporary and may be stayed by a court of appeals. Signifi-
cantly, the measure of permissible busing is the amount of transporta-
tion used in the year previous to the court order. If children were
bused to segregated schools in order to maintain segregation, they
may be bused an equal distance under court order to accomplish
desegregation. 93 Professor Bork argues that this would permit most
examples of de jure segregation to be remedied since unitary systems
may usually be achieved through existing bus routes and other less
drastic remedies. 94 Moreover, secondary students may be bused even
further if necessary.
It may be arguable that the original section 403 is constitutional
because it does not completely abolish busing.19 5 There may be situa-
tions in which a court would otherwise order more busing were it
not for section 403.116 But this may be the exception rather than
the rule.197 Professor Bork believes that these restrictions are within
the congressional power to control remedies and would not interfere
in the constitutional role of the courts. Indeed, if this were not true,
then Congress' enforcement power under section five would be illu-
sory.-99 Critics of section 403, however, argue that Green, Davis and
Alexander require immediate desegregation by the most effective
means. 99 When this standard requires a degree of busing greater
than previous "averages," a limitation on that remedy might be a
cational agency for the first time, unless it is demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that no other method set out in section 402 will provide
an adequate remedy for the denial of equal educational opportunity or
equal protection of the laws that has been found by such court, department,
or agency. The implementation of a plan calling for increased transporta-
tion, as described in clause (1) or (2) of this subsection shall be deemed
a temporary measure.
193. BoRx 21.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. See Clark v. Board of Educ., 449 F.2d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1971)
(court-ordered busing preceded by no busing at all); Lee v. Macon County Bd.
of Educ., 448 F.2d 746, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1971) (court-ordered busing exceeding
previous averages).
197. Boax 21.
198. Professor Bork considers the original section 403 to be little more than
a congressional enactment of the judicial restriction of busing recognized in
Swann I: "It hardly needs stating that limits on time of travel will vary with
many factors, but probably with none more than the age of the students." 402
U.S. at 31.
199. Goldberg 346-47.
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denial of due process.200 Section 403 may also be viewed as a "dilu-
tion" of equal protection rights through Congress' enforcement
power. Whether it endangers the role of the Supreme Court in the
constitutional separation of powers may depend on how frequently
the courts would otherwise exceed previous busing "averages."
The use of previous "averages" to limit busing orders may be only
an academic question since the House of Representatives has passed
an amended version of section 403 that is considerably stricter.20'
The amended section 403 (a) replaces the original sections 403 (a) - (b)
by providing that:
No court, department, or agency of the United States shall,
pursuant to section 402, order the implementation of a plan that
would require the transportation of any student to a school other
than the school closest or next closest to his place of residence
which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education
for such student. 02
Under this statute, courts would be forbidden to order busing beyond
the next closest school even though the school board had previously
utilized busing over greater distances to achieve segregation. Further-
more, unlike the original section, no provision is made for busing
secondary students further than elementary students. In addition,
the amended statute introduces a new restriction preventing the fed-
eral courts from ordering renewed busing to compensate for shifts
in residential population after a school system has once become
unitary.03 This has an effect similar to terminating a federal court's
jurisdiction of a particular desegregation case once it has determined
satisfactory compliance by the school board with constitutional re-
quirements.
200. Id. at 346.
201. See note 170 supra.
202. EEOA § 403(a), as amended.
203. EEOA § 403(c), as amended, provides:
When a court of competent jurisdiction determines that a school system is
desegregated, or that it meets the constitutional requirements, or that it is
a unitary system, or that it has no vestiges of a dual system, and thereafter
residential shifts in population occur which result in school population
changes in any school within such a desegregated school system, no educa-
tional agency because of such shifts shall be required by any court, depart-
ment, or agency of the United States to formulate, or implement any mod-
ification of the court approved desegregation plan, which would require
transportation of students to compensate wholly or in part for such shifts
in school population so occurring.
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Assuming that the original section 403 might have been constitu-
tional, the amended section is much more vulnerable to attack. The
district courts would no longer be permitted to consider previous
busing averages in reaching an effective remedy. Furthermore, its
implementation of section 402 would be severely limited insofar as
it could not use bus transportation beyond the child's own neighbor-
hood. In some situations, the closest or next closest schools may be
so far away that busing is required. This underscores the need for
greater busing if these schools are segregated. Even Professor Bork
recognizes that Congress could not completely eliminate busing as a
remedy since some degree is required to secure the constitutional
right to equal education.204 Whether this new limitation would dilute
equal protection rights, interfere in the essential role of the Supreme
Court, or violate due process turns ultimately on how essential busing
is to the implementation of Brown L Certainly Congress has not com-
pletely prohibited busing. But the residue that remains may be so
insufficient under the standards of Green and Davis that busing is
effectively denied in most circumstances.
Other provisions of Title IV further limit the extent of forced
busing. Section 404 forbids a federal court from ignoring or altering
school district boundaries unless they were drawn with segregatory
intent.2 05 Although Professor Bork does not believe that the four-
teenth amendment requires school district consolidation, absent a
segregatory intent,200 this section responds to lower court decisions
that have consolidated adjoining school systems and required busing
between the formerly separate districts. 207 It seems unlikely that many
federal courts would issue busing orders within the narrow restric-
tions of section 403 that would require the consolidation of school
districts and the crossing of old boundaries. But if this situation did
arise, or if section 403 should be held unconstitutional, section 404
204. Bosu 16.
205. EEOA § 404 provides:
In the formulation of remedies under section 401 or 402 of this Act, the
lines drawn by a State, subdividing its territory into separate school districts,
shall not be ignored or altered except where it is established that the lines
were drawn for the purpose, and had the effect of segregating children
among public schools on the basis of race, color, or national origin.
206. BORic 23. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of school
consolidation. If it overturns lower court decisions requiring this remedy, Pro-
fessor Bork may be correct.
207. See note 26 supra.
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might well be subject to constitutional challenge. If such relief is
constitutionally required, then section 404 may deny certain litigants
a remedy indispensable to effective relief.
Other sections of Title IV placed time limitations on busing orders.
The amended sections 407 and 408 require termination whenever
the district court determines that no person is "effectively exduded"
on account of race but provide that later segregatory action may be
remedied.0 8 These provisions find some support in the language of
Swann 1.209 The amended sections are stricter than the original
versions to the extent that termination may occur before the five and
ten year periods are ended. Yet they are more liberal insofar as they
provide for "revived" jurisdiction to issue further remedial orders if
necessary. Furthermore, the courts retain the power to determine
when and if persons are no longer "effectively exduded" by seg-
208. EEOA § 407, as amended, provides:
Any court order requiring, directly or indirectly, the transportation of stu-
dents for the purpose of remedying a denial of the equal protection of the
laws shall, to the extent of such transportation, be terminated if the court
finds the defendant educational agency is not effectively excluding any per-
son from any school because of race, color, or national origin, and this
shall be so, whether or not the schools of such agency were in the past
segregated de jure or de facto. No additional order requiring such educa-
tional agency to transport students for such purpose shall be entered unless
such agency is found to be effectively excluding any person from any school
because of race, color, or national origin, and this shall be so, whether or
not the schools of such agency were in the past segregated de jure or de facto.
EEOA § 408, as amended, provides:
Any court order requiring the desegregation of a school system shall be ter-
minated, if the court finds the schools of the defendant educational agency
are a unitary school system, one within which no person is to be effectively
excluded from any school because of race, color, or national origin, and
this shall be so, whether or not such school system was in the past segregated
de jure or de facto. No additional order shall be entered against such
agency for such purpose unless the schools of such agency are no longer
a unitary school system.
209. The Court remarked:
At some point, these school authorities and others like them should have
achieved full compliance with this Court's decision in Brown I. The systems
will then be "unitary" in the sense required by our decisions in Green and
Alevander. . . . Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitu-
tionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition
of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accom-
plished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from
the system. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to
deal with future problems; but in the absence of a showing that either
the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately
attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composi-
tion of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be
necessary.
402 U.S. at 31-32.
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regatory actions. Thus, they are not bound to surrender their jurisdic-
tion until they determine that dual school systems are dismantled.
Former Justice Goldberg believes these provisions are unconstitu-
tional because they perpetuate segregation.2 10 Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Raney v. Board of Education2" has held that district courts
should retain jurisdiction until dual school systems are completely
dismantled. But the terms of both the original and amended sections
require termination only when the courts determine that dual school
systems are eliminated.
B. Necessity of Busing
It has already been suggested that the constitutionality of anti-
busing legislation turns on the necessity of the prohibited busing
orders. Implicit in a determination of necessity is the degree of dis-
tinction between rights and remedies in school desegregation cases.
Swann I certainly did not hold that there is a constitutional right to
busing. It is merely one of several remedies that may justifiably be
used to eliminate dual school systems. Green and Alexander do re-
quire, however, immediate and effective desegregation. In some situa-
tions busing may be the only remedy by which these standards can
be met. In those circumstances the right-remedy distinction disap-
pears. The ultimate issue, then, is when do these circumstances arise?
Proponents of anti-busing legislation rely on Swann I as the
"language of discretion and remedy rather than the language of basic
constitutional right."2 2 Certainly there is language in Swann I to
support this position. 213 The Supreme Court has also indicated that
the use of busing is tempered by other values upon which it might
impinge.214 But the arguments in favor of competing values, such as
neighborhood schools, cannot overcome the need for busing if it is,
in fact, the only effective remedy.
Supporters of anti-busing legislation argue that STMA and EEOA
only affect federal court busing orders. Plaintiffs may still seek busing
210. Goldberg 356-57.
211. 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
212. BoRx 14.
213. The Court stated: "Conditions in different localities will vary so widely
that no rigid rules can be laid down to govern all situations. . . .No rigid
guidelines as to student transportation can be given for application to the infinite
variety of problems presented in thousands of situations." 402 U.S. at 29.
214. Id. at 27.
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orders in the state courts. Thus the remedy is not completely barred
since only the forum has been changed. Certainly a complete pro-
hibition of forced busing would have to apply to state courts as
well.215 The effectiveness of an alternative state remedy, however,
depends on good faith enforcement of the equal protection clause and
compliance with Swann L The only remaining federal supervision
would be review by the United States Supreme Court of carefully
selected state supreme court decisions. This limited review could
result in the "schizophrenic maintenance of abstract principles" and
require a reassessment of the entire scope of Supreme Court re-
view.216 There is also a strong possibility that state courts would not
be as receptive to busing as were the federal courts. Many state judges
must face re-election; and equal protection rights could be denied
federal review by the "adequate state ground" doctrine.2127 Under
these limitations the remaining judicial review by the Supreme Court
over busing cases may be so ineffective as to destroy the role of the
Court in the constitutional plan.
It is not difficult to conceive of situations in which busing is in-
dispensable to the achievement of a unitary system. Unless an attend-
ance zone is composed of blacks and whites who are so close to a
strategically located school that transporation is unnecessary, some
busing will be inevitable to accomplish the minimum degree of racial
mixing necessary to achieve unitary schools.218 In view of segregated
housing patterns this idyllic situation is not common. In Northcross
v. Board of Education219 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
noted that where one school is all black in a black neighborhood,
and another is all white in a white neighborhood, but are miles apart,
busing is the only remedy by which any desegregation can be accom-
plished.220 Similarly, the Supreme Court recognized in Swann I that
"[d]esegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school."221
In Swann 1I the Court found that:
[Ain absolute prohibition against transportation of students
assigned on the basis of race, "or for the purpose of creating a
215. 52 BoSTON U.L. Rav. 321, 325 (1972).
216. Id. at 325 n.42.
217. Id. at 326 nn.43, 44.
218. Id. at 327.
219. 444 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1971).
220. Id. at 1182.
221. 402 U.S. at 30.
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balance or ratio," will similarly hamper the ability of local auth-
ority to effectively remedy constitutional violations. As noted in
Swann [1], bus transportation has long been an integral part of
all public educational systems, and it is unlikely that a truly
effective remedy could be devised without continued reliance
upon it.222
Swann 11 may arguably be distinguished since it involved a state
statute that usurped Congress' power to control federal remedies. 22 1
But an explanation based on the Supremacy Clause creates a distinc-
tion without a difference. The necessity of busing to desegregate does
not depend on which legislature might properly legislate on the sub-
ject. A more substantial distinction is in the degree of prohibition.
North Carolina sought to completely prohibit busing,24 while Con-
gress has allowed a limited amount of school transportation.
A factual determination that busing is indispensable cannot be
expressed in universal or general terms. Unless the Supreme Court
later declares that in certain prescribed circumstances, busing must
always be ordered, the district courts must continue to balance the
equities and order busing if the facts before them require that remedy.
Federal appellate courts may then review only the reasonableness of
the order under Swann I guidelines. Thus, a determination of con-
stitutionality will not be aided by generalizations disguised as find-
ings of fact applicable to every school system.
CONCLUSION
The early history of STMA and EEOA indicates that Congress
may not enact them into law. This does not, however, make the issues
they present moot. Their constitutionality can only be conclusively
determined by the Supreme Court. It is possible that other Congresses
in the near future may revive these bills and enact them into law or
enact similar legislation with the same purpose. Congress might also
later enact legislation with similar effects but in other contexts, in-
dependent of the busing controversy.
The basic principles of equity and constitutional law do not pro-
222. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
223. BORK 16. See note 151 supra.
224. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 115-176.1 (1969) provides in part:
No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on account
of race, creed, color, or national origin, or for the purpose of creating a
balance or ratio of race, religion, or national origin. Involuntary busing is
prohibited, and public funds shall not be used for any such busing.
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vide a simple resolution of the issues presented by anti-busing legisla-
tion because there is little case law in point. Since much depends
on the factual necessity of busing, the constitutionality of these pro-
visions can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. Even the
extent of Congress' power to enact anti-busing laws turns on a factual
determination. Since busing is not a universal requirement in every
desegregation plan, a statutory limitation does not necessarily infringe
on separation of powers or dilute the fourteenth amendment. Cer-
tainly, the statutes could not be declared patently unconstitutional
as violations of due process since there are conceivable circumstances
in which they might be constitutionally applied.225 But whenever a
federal court finds that busing in excess of that allowed by STMA
or EEOA is indispensable to desegregation in the case at bar, these
statutes may well be unconstitutional in their application. Thus the
courts might construe the anti-busing laws to be valid restrictions
applicable only in the limited cases in which busing is not deemed
essential.2- 'o Such an interpretation would certainly defeat the intent
of Congress.
A more permanent and predictable solution would be a constitu-
tional amendment. This, however, is objectionable because an amend-
ment might be so broad as to dilute the fourteenth amendment, or
so narrow that it "trifles with the Constitution by dignifying as law
the transient political slogan of an election year." 227
A less drastic, but equally effective solution, would be the over-
ruling of Swann I and Swann 11.228 The appropriateness of such an
about-face by the Court may be influenced by the difficulty involved
in accomplishing such a result.
223. Certainly, in those situations where adequate relief may be formulated
with busing within the limitations of EEOA or STAIA or with no busing at all,
the statutes would not deny due process.
226. In United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1970),
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that section 2000c-6 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did withhold from federal courts the power to order
busing. But this restriction could not be exercised so as to "frustrate the constitu-
tional prohibition [on segregation]." Id. at 1130. This view that section 2000c-6
actually "withheld" power from the courts was later rejected by the Supreme
Court in Swann I, but the Seventh Circuit's approach to the issue may be use-
ful in construing the EEOA.
227. See Goldberg 361. The implications of the many proposed constitu-
tional amendments are beyond the scope of this paper.
228. See Civil Rights v. Individual Liberty: Swann, and Other Monsters of
Impetuous Justice, supra note 23, at 382.
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